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n 15 February of this year, 
shortly after the number of 
people Dr. Jack Kevorkian 
had helped to commit sui- 
cide swelled to fifteen, the Michigan 
legislature passed a law, effective that 
very day, making assisted suicide a 
felony punishable by up to four years 
in prison. The law, which is automat- 
ically repealed six months after a 
newly established commission on 
death and dying recommends per- 
manent legislation, prohibits anyone 
with knowledge that another person 
intends to commit suicide from "in- 
tentionally providing the physical 
means" by which that other person 
does so or from "intentionally partic- 
ipat[ing] in a physical act" by which 
she does so.1 
A two-thirds majority of each house 
was needed to give the new Michigan 
law immediate effect, but that re- 
quirement was easily met. The gover- 
nor applauded the legislature and 
signed the law the same day. But this 
is not the end of the story. A week 
later, the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Michigan brought a lawsuit 
on behalf of two cancer patients and 
several health care professionals who 
specialize in the care of the termi- 
nally ill, attacking the law's constitu- 
tionality. The essence of the chal- 
lenge is that insofar as the law prohib- 
its a health professional, family mem- 
ber, or friend from assisting a com- 
petent, terminally ill person who 
wishes to hasten her death, the law 
violates the due process clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions and 
the "Right to Privacy Guarantee" of 
the state constitution. 
If the Michigan Supreme Court 
overturns the prohibition against as- 
sisted suicide on state constitutional 
grounds, this particular lawsuit will 
come to an end. If, however, as I think 
likely, the state supreme court up- 
holds the prohibition, the U.S. Su- 
preme Court may decide to review 
the matter. Since approximately 
twenty-five states expressly prohibit 
Are Laws against Assisted 
Suicide Unconstitutional? 
by Yale Kamisar 
The Supreme Court, reluctant to find constitutional rights 
in areas marked by divisive social and legal debate, is not 
likely to constitutionalize a right to assisted suicide. The 
Court should cleave to the tradition of discouraging suicide 
and criminalizing its assistance. 
assisted suicide by statute and 
another ten or twelve make some 
types of assisted suicide a form of 
murder or manslaughter,2 the Su- 
preme Court is likely to address the 
question in some case from some 
state, whether Michigan or another, 
in the near future. 
In this article I shall only discuss 
federal constitutional arguments for 
invalidating laws against suicide. I 
shall also discuss various reasons why 
I believe these arguments will (and 
should) fail. 
Is There a "Right" to Commit 
Suicide? 
So far as I know, no state law makes 
either suicide or attempted suicide a 
crime. Why is this so? And what fol- 
lows from this? 
According to Dan Brock, who sup- 
ports both physician-assisted suicide 
and voluntary active euthanasia, the 
fact "that suicide or attempted sui- 
cide is no longer a criminal offense in 
virtually all states indicates an accept- 
ance of individual self-determination 
in the taking of one's own life 
analogous to that required for volun- 
tary active euthanasia." I am not sure 
what Professor Brock means by "ac- 
ceptance"; it is an ambiguous term. 
In context, however, he seems to be 
viewing the fact that we no longer 
punish suicide or attempted suicide 
as approval of these acts or at least as 
recognition that self-determination or 
autonomy extends this far-namely, 
that taking one's life is a valid applica- 
tion or aspect of individual self-deter- 
mination. If this is what he means, he 
is quite mistaken. 
As the most comprehensive and 
most heavily documented law review 
article ever written on the subject 
makes clear, abolition of such "pun- 
ishments" as ignominious burial for 
suicide and then the decriminaliza- 
tion of both suicide and attempted 
suicide did not come about because 
suicide was deemed a "human right" 
or even because it was no longer con- 
sidered reprehensible. These changes 
occurred, rather, because punish- 
ment was seen as unfair to innocent 
relatives of the suicide and because 
those who committed or attempted 
to commit the act were thought to 
be prompted by mental illness.4 
Some of this thinking is reflected 
in the comments to the American 
Law Institute's Model Penal Code. 
The code does criminalize aiding or 
soliciting another to commit suicide, 
but not suicide itself or attempted sui- 
cide. Why not? "There is a certain 
moral extravagance in imposing 
criminal punishment on a person 
who has sought his own self-destruc- 
tion ... and who more properly re- 
quires medical or psychiatric atten- 
tion."5 
Yale Kamisar is Clarence Darrow Distin- 
guished University Professor at The Univer- 
sity of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor 
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Sympathy and pity for the individ- 
ual who attempts suicide "emphati- 
cally did not mean approval of the 
act." From colonial days through at 
least the 1970s, "the predominant 
attitude of society and the law has 
been one of opposition to suicide."6 
The Model Penal Code's judgment 
that "there is no form of criminal 
punishment that is acceptable for a 
completed suicide and that criminal 
punishment is singularly ineffica- 
cious to deter attempts to commit sui- 
cide" (p. 94) does not mean that 
there is a "right" to commit the act. As 
Leon Kass has pointed out, the capac- 
ity to take one's life-"I have inclina- 
tion, means, reasons, opportunity, 
and you cannot stop me, and it is not 
against the law"-does not establish 
the right to do so. Nor does it mean 
that one has "a justified claim against 
others that they act in a fitting man- 
ner."7 As a practical matter, at least so 
long as they do not resort to physical 
violence, parents are "free" to treat 
their children unkindly, even cruelly. 
But few, if any, would say that a 
mother or father has a "right" to be a 
bad parent. 
Society can do something about 
those who aid another to commit sui- 
cide-and it has. Throughout our 
history we have directed the force of 
the criminal law against aiding or 
assisting suicide. The commentary to 
the Model Penal Code notes that the 
fact that penal sanctions will not 
deter the suicide itself 
does not mean that the criminal 
law is equally powerless to in- 
fluence the behavior of those who 
would aid or induce another to 
take his own life. Moreover, in 
principle it would seem that the 
interests in the sanctity of life that 
are represented by the criminal 
homicide laws are threatened by 
one who expresses a willingness to 
participate in taking the life of 
another, even though the act may 
be accomplished with the con- 
sent, or at the request, of the sui- 
cide victim (p. 100). 
Another word about the Model 
Penal Code. In the memorable dic- 
tum of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "It is 
revolting to have no better reason for 
a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV."8 The 
quickest way to refute the belief not a 
few may hold that the reason for the 
criminal prohibition against assisted 
suicide falls into Holmes's category 
is to point to the position taken by the 
code. Its final "Official Draft" was the 
product of many years of research, 
deliberation, drafting, and revising by 
the most eminent criminal law 
scholars of the 1950s and 60s, led by 
Herbert Wechsler of Columbia Uni- 
versity and Louis B. Schwartz of the 
University of Pennsylvania. To quote 
a leading scholar of the present day, 
the code "has become the principal 
text in criminal law teaching, the 
point of departure for criminal law 
scholarship, and the greatest single 
influence on the many new state 
codes that have followed in its wake. "9 
The Model Code's reporters con- 
sidered the argument that the crimi- 
nality of assisted suicide should turn 
upon "the presence of a selfish mo- 
tive" (a position supported by one of 
its special consultants, England's 
Glanville Williams), but concluded 
that "the wiser course is to maintain 
the prohibition and rely on mitiga- 
tion in the sentence when the ground 
for it appears."'0 With the stimulus of 
the Model Code, in the next decade 
and a half, eight states passed new 
laws specifically prohibiting assisted 
suicide and eleven other jurisdictions 
revised their existing statutes." 
Does the "Right to Die" Include 
the Right to Assisted Suicide? 
As a rallying cry, the "right to die" 
is hard to beat. But it is much easier 
to chant a slogan than to apply it to 
specific situations. Most would con- 
sider the refusal of lifesaving medi- 
cal procedures under certain cir- 
cumstances (such as terminal illness 
and severe pain) an apt illustration 
of the "right to die." But the term 
has also been used loosely and 
broadly to embrace such claims as 
the right to another's help in com- 
mitting suicide and the right to 
authorize another to engage in active 
euthanasia. 
Many proponents of the "right to 
die" are quick to point out that the 
"sanctity of life" is not an absolute or 
unqualified value (and they are 
right), but they are slow to realize that 
the same is true of the "right to die." 
There is no absolute or general 
"right to die." The only right or lib- 
erty that the Karen Ann Quinlan case 
and subsequent so-called "right to 
die" rulings have established is the 
right under certain circumstances to 
be disconnected from artificial life 
support systems or, as many have 
called it, the right to die a natural 
death. And the new Michigan ban 
against assisted suicide recognizes 
that right by explicitly excluding 
"withholding or withdrawing medical 
treatment" from its coverage. (It also 
exempts "prescribing, dispensing or 
administering" medication or treat- 
ment designed "to relieve pain or dis- 
comfort and not to cause death, even 
if the medication or procedure may 
hasten or increase the risk of death.") 
In the 1970s, the Quinlan case 
brought the "right to die" issue to 
national prominence and set the 
tone for the developments in law and 
bioethics that followed. But the Quin- 
lan court specifically distinguished 
between committing or assisting in a 
suicide and what it called "the ending 
of artificial life support systems"-the 
only issue presented.12 
As one of the leading commenta- 
tors in this field, Rutgers Law 
School's Norman Cantor, recently 
observed: "The assertion that rejec- 
tion of life-saving medical treatment 
by competent patients constitutes 
suicide has been uniformly re- 
jected-usually based on a distinc- 
tion between letting nature take its 
course and initiating external death- 
causing agents."'3 
The distinction between euthanasia 
(or, I believe, assisted suicide as well) 
and "letting die" is elucidated in The 
Troubled Dream of Life, a soon-to-be- 
published book by Daniel Callahan. 
"As a reality of nature," observes Dr. 
Callahan, "killing and letting die are 
causally different.... There must be 
an underlying fatal pathology if allow- 
ing to die is even possible. Killing, by 
contrast, provides its own fatal 
pathology. Nothing but the action of 
the doctor giving the lethal injection 
is necessary to bring about death."'14 
Since the reasons usually advanced 
to distinguish persons terminating 
life support from "ordinary" suicides 
do not strike Jeb Rubenfeld as "alto- 
gether persuasive" (nor me either), 
Professor Rubenfeld has suggested 
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another answer to "this painful 
riddle": 
For right-to-die patients, being 
forced to live is in fact to be forced 
into a particular, all-consuming, 
totally dependent, and indeed 
rigidly standardized life: the life of 
one confined to a hospital bed, 
attached to medical machinery, 
and tended to by medical pro- 
fessionals. It is a life almost totally 
occupied.... 
In contrast, the "ordinary" suicide 
suffers no such total occupation 
of his life or affirmative use of his 
body. An avenue of escape is fore- 
closed to him [but the prohibi- 
tion of suicide] does not, as a rule, 
direct lives into a particular, nar- 
rowly confined course." 
This is a thoughtful answer and an 
interesting one. But still more inter- 
esting, I believe, is that this commen- 
tator, who has a strong commitment 
to the right to privacy and who usually 
interprets it expansively, evidently 
feels a deep need (as I do) to draw a 
boundary somehow between the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sus- 
taining medical treatment and what 
he calls "'ordinary' suicide." 
The one "right to die" case that 
rivals Quinlan for prominence is the 
1990 Nancy Beth Cruzan decision, the 
only case on death, dying, and the 
"right of privacy" ever decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. As did Quinlan, 
the Cruzan case involved the right to 
end artificial life support, and it too 
provides no comfort to proponents 
of a constitutional right to assisted 
suicide. 
The Cruzan Court sustained a 
state's power to keep alive, over her 
family's objections, an incompetent 
patient who had not left clear in- 
structions for ending life-sustaining 
treatment. In the course of reject- 
ing the efforts of Ms. Cruzan's 
parents to terminate her artificial 
feeding, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
who spoke for five members of the 
Court, pointed out that a state has 
an undeniable interest in the pro- 
tection and preservation of human 
life-even the life of a person in a 
persistent vegetative state. The chief 
justice supported this assertion by 
noting that "the majority of states in 
this country have laws imposing 
criminal penalties on one who assists 
another to commit suicide."'16 
If a majority of the Supreme Court 
meant to suggest that laws against 
assisted suicide are constitutionally 
suspect, it chose a strange way of 
doing so. 
The chief justice "assumed for pur- 
poses of this case" that a competent 
person does have "a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse lifesaving hy- 
dration and nutrition." But he de- 
clined to characterize it as a "fun- 
damental right," a designation that 
requires a state to offer a compelling 
justification for a right's restriction (a 
test the state can rarely satisfy). He 
called the right instead a Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest: "Al- 
though many state courts have held 
that a right to refuse treatment is 
encompassed by a generalized con- 
stitutional right of privacy, we have 
never so held. We believe this issue is 
more properly analyzed in terms of a 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty in- 
terest. " 
"By avoiding 'fundamental right' 
language," comments John Robert- 
son, "the Court may implicitly allow 
states to restrict the 'liberty interest' 
upon a lesser showing of need than it 
would require if that interest were 
characterized as a fundamental 
right." Perhaps "any reasonable state 
interest" would justify state interfer- 
ence with that liberty "or at least one 
which did not impose an 'undue 
burden.'"' 17 
Of course, the Court did not sug- 
gest that one has even so much as "a 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty in- 
terest" in assisted suicide, and I can- 
not believe that it will do so in the 
foreseeable future. If I am right, a 
Court assessing the constitutionality 
of a ban against assisted suicide 
would give great deference to the 
state legislature; if it furthered some 
coherent conception of the public 
good, that would probably suffice. 
The Cruzan case is hardly the 
Court's last word on death, dying, ter- 
mination of life support, assisted sui- 
cide, and euthanasia. The principles 
lurking in this area will be brought 
into sharper focus only by new prod- 
ding of the facts of new cases and by 
taking a fresh look, each time, at the 
overall problem. If Cruzan demon- 
strates anything, however, I think it 
signals the reluctance of the High 
Court to "constitutionalize" an area 
marked by divisive social and legal 
debate and its inclination to defer 
instead to the states' judgments in 
this difficult field.'8 A Court that re- 
fused to "constitutionalize" a "right to 
die" broad enough to uphold the 
claims of the Cruzan family is hardly 
likely to "constitutionalize" a right to 
assisted suicide. 
Justice Scalia's Opinion 
We should not forget that there was 
onejustice in the Cruzan case who did 
equate the termination of life sup- 
port with "ordinary" suicide-An- 
tonin Scalia. Although his lone con- 
curring opinion was more or less ig- 
nored by the other justices, it should 
not go unnoticed. 
Justice Scalia maintained that for 
constitutional purposes "there is 
nothing distinctive about accepting 
death through the refusal of 'medical 
treatment,' as opposed to accepting it 
through the refusal of [natural] food, 
or through the failure to shut off the 
engine and get out of the car after 
parking in one's garage after work." 
As he viewed the case, the request of 
Nancy Cruzan's parents to terminate 
their daughter's artificial feeding and 
hydration was, in effect, the assertion 
of a "right to suicide." 
But Justice Scalia is well aware that 
"on the question you ask depends the 
answer you get." A principal reason, 
surely, why he framed the question 
the way he did was his confidence 
that there was no way a majority of 
the Court would recognize a constitu- 
tional right to commit suicide. And 
nothing any of the other eight jus- 
tices said suggests that Scalia's confi- 
dence was unfounded. 
In fact, the other justices did not 
say anything about a "right to sui- 
cide." None of them disputed Scalia's 
point "that American law has always 
accorded the State the power to pre- 
vent, by force if necessary, suicide." 
Nor did any of them disagree that 
"there is no significant support for 
the claim that a right to suicide is so 
rooted in our tradition that it may be 
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty."' As 
Louis Seidman remarks, the Cruzan 
dissenters "carefully avoid any claim 
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that state suicide statutes are uncon- 
stitutional-a reticence that Justice 
Scalia powerfully exploits in his con- 
curring opinion."9 This is a reti- 
cence, I might add, that does not 
bode well for proponents of a consti- 
tutional right to assisted suicide. 
Although none of Justice Scalia's 
colleagues responded in so many 
words to his argument that the termi- 
nation of lifesaving medical treat- 
ment constitutes suicide, they re- 
sponded nevertheless. They all 
framed the question in terms of a 
right to refuse or to be free from "un- 
wanted medical treatment" or, more 
specifically, "unwanted artificial nutri- 
tion and hydration." 
As a matter of logic, I think there is a 
good deal to be said for analogizing a 
patient's termination of life-sustain- 
ing medical treatment to "ordinary" 
suicide. But law is not entirely a syllo- 
gism. 
It may be helpful to view the Cruzan 
case as involving two competing tradi- 
tions.20 One is the common-law right 
to refuse medical treatment, even 
lifesaving surgery--in the language 
of the Court, "the logical corollary of 
the doctrine of informed consent," a 
doctrine "firmly entrenched in Amer- 
ican tort law," is the right not to con- 
sent, that is, to reject treatment. The 
other tradition, which has continued 
to exist alongside the first one, is the 
antisuicide tradition, as evidenced by 
society's discouragement of suicide 
and attempted suicide and by the 
many criminal laws against assisted 
suicide. 
In Cruzan a majority, perhaps as 
many as eight justices, evidently de- 
cided that the termination of artifi- 
cial nutrition and hydration was more 
consistent with the rationale of the 
cases upholding the right to refuse 
treatment; so far as we can tell, only 
Justice Scalia believed it implicated 
the concerns underlying the antisui- 
cide tradition. 
Assisted Suicide vs. Active 
Voluntary Euthanasia 
The line between doctor-assisted 
suicide and physician-administered 
voluntary euthanasia is a fine one 
that is often blurred. Voluntary eu- 
thanasia "has been variously de- 
scribed as 'assisted suicide' or 'within 
the knife's edge between suicide and 
murder,'" and suicide has sometimes 
been called "self-administered eutha- 
nasia.'21 
Doctor-assisted suicide is not quite 
active voluntary euthanasia for, un- 
like euthanasia, the final act, the one 
that brings on death, is performed by 
"it puts the physician in a very power- 
ful position," whereas in the case of 
doctor-assisted suicide "the balance 
of power between doctor and patient 
is more nearly equal."23 
I find this reasoning more con- 
clusory than explanatory. Dr. Quill 
would require many safeguards for 
Voluntary euthanasia would receive very serious consid- 
eration once assisted suicide were legalized or as soon 
as the Supreme Court established aconstitutional right 
to commit "rational" suicide. 
the patient herself, not her doctor. 
But suppose that a person is unable to 
swallow the barbiturates that will 
bring about death or lacks the physi- 
cal capacity to trigger a suicide ma- 
chine? If the right to control the time 
and manner of one's death-the 
right to shape one's death in the most 
humane and dignified manner one 
chooses-is well founded, how can it 
be denied to someone simply because 
she is unable to perform the final act 
by herself? Although there is a "me- 
chanical" distinction between assisted 
suicide and euthanasia, is it not a dis- 
tinction without a difference? 
Yes, answered the late Joseph 
Fletcher, who advocated active eu- 
thanasia for some fifty years. As he 
viewed the matter, "It is impossible to 
separate [active voluntary euthana- 
sia] from suicide; it is indeed, a form 
of suicide" and the case for active vol- 
untary euthanasia "depends upon 
the case for the righteousness of sui- 
cide." James Rachels, author of a 
famous assault on the distinction be- 
tween "killing" and "letting die," sim- 
ilarly maintains that "the permissi- 
bility of euthanasia follows from the 
permissibility of suicide-a result that 
probably will not surprise any 
thoughtful person."22 
That may be, but it is a result some 
thoughtful persons have strongly re- 
sisted. Thus, in his new book, Dr. 
Timothy Quill comes out in favor of 
physician-assisted suicide but balks at 
active voluntary euthanasia. He does 
not support euthanasia because of 
the "potential for abuse" and because 
doctor-assisted suicide (the patient 
must freely, clearly, and repeatedly 
ask to die; her judgment must not be 
distorted; the physician must make 
sure that the patient's suffering and 
request are not the product of inade- 
quate comfort care). If, as he believes, 
these safeguards would greatly re- 
duce the risk of abuse and render the 
balance of power between doctor and 
patient relatively equal, why would 
they not achieve the same results for 
voluntary euthanasia? Conversely, if, 
even when all the safeguards Quill 
proposes are in place, it would still be 
imprudent to legalize active volun- 
tary euthanasia, why is it safe to sanc- 
tion assisted suicide? 
Quill recognizes that "access to 
medical care in the United States is 
too inequitable and many doctor- 
patient relationships too impersonal 
to tolerate the risks of condoning ac- 
tive voluntary euthanasia" (p. 160). 
But why can't the very same thing be 
said about tolerating the risks of con- 
doning assisted suicide? 
I find it difficult to avoid the con- 
clusion that Dr. Quill's position is 
colored by the fact, as he notes, that 
"unlike assisted suicide, where the 
legal implications have yet to be fully 
clarified, euthanasia is illegal in all 
states in the United States and likely 
to be vigorously prosecuted" (p. 142). 
Dr. Quill and I disagree about a num- 
ber of things. But I venture to say we 
are in agreement on one: the uni- 
form ban against active euthanasia is 
not going to be struck down on the 
ground that it violates the "right to 
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die." Therefore, a proponent of the 
right to assisted suicide is under- 
standably likely to put as much dis- 
tance as possible between that con- 
cept and euthanasia. 
Although he would not legalize vol- 
untary euthanasia, at least not at this 
time, Dr. Quill does consider it "an 
area worthy of our serious consid- 
eration, since it would allow patients 
who have exhausted all other rea- 
sonable options to choose death 
rather than continue suffering" (p. 
143). I make bold to say that volun- 
tary euthanasia would receive very se- 
rious consideration once assisted sui- 
cide were legalized or as soon as the 
Supreme Court established a consti- 
tutional right to commit "rational" 
suicide. 
Although I am opposed to both as- 
sisted suicide and voluntary euthan- 
asia, I find the position of Professor 
Brock (who supports both practices) 
more coherent and more principled 
than Dr. Quill's: 
In both [assisted suicide and vol- 
untary euthanasia], the choice 
rests fullywith the patient. In both 
[cases] the patient acts last in the 
sense of the right to change his or 
her mind until the point at which 
the lethal process becomes irre- 
versible.... 
If there is no significant, intrinsic 
moral difference between the 
two, it is difficult to see why public 
or legal policy should permit one 
but not the other; worries about 
abuse or about giving anyone do- 
minion over the lives of others 
apply equally well to either.24 
The fine distinction between as- 
sisted suicide and voluntary euthana- 
sia was blurred by the hard-fought 
campaigns in Washington (1991) 
and California (1992) to legalize "aid- 
in-dying," a label covering both as- 
sisted suicide and voluntary euthana- 
sia. I watched both campaigns very 
closely and came away with the dis- 
tinct impression that few, if any, un- 
derstood the distinction between the 
two practices, paid any attention to it, 
or cared one whit about it. 
The inability of the media, the pub- 
lic, and even members of the medical 
profession to grasp this fine distinc- 
tion is powerfully illustrated by a 
two-hour presentation, "Choosing 
Death," a program shown on most 
PBS stations about the time this ar- 
ticle was going to press. 
Although the program was billed as 
a "debate about euthanasia," it soon 
became clear that it was a debate 
about assisted suicide as well. Very 
early in the program the moderator, 
Roger Mudd, announced: "The issue 
is doctor-assisted suicide and eutha- 
nasia." At another point he asked 
Professor Margaret Battin whether 
there was any way "other than eutha- 
nasia or physician-assisted suicide ... 
to end suffering." Still later, he asked 
a physician affiliated with Harlem 
Hospital "whether you think eutha- 
nasia-physician-assisted suicide- 
poses any dangers to America's 
minorities."25 And although Dr. Jack 
Kevorkian has been careful never to 
practice active voluntary euthanasia 
(all the people he helped die by sui- 
cide performed "the last act" them- 
selves), he appeared in the opening 
segment. 
It is difficult to fault the moderator 
for treating assisted suicide and vol- 
untary euthanasia interchangeably. 
After all, none of the physicians or 
bioethicists who appeared on the 
program saw the need or, at any rate, 
took the trouble to draw any distinc- 
tion between the two concepts. At 
one point Dr. Howard Brody main- 
tained that "we can find other alter- 
natives that don't require physician- 
assisted suicide or euthanasia." And 
at another point Professor Dan 
Brock pointed out that "we ought to 
be doing our best to improve all 
dying patients' care, whatever one's 
view about assisted suicide, or eutha- 
nasia, is." (As mentioned earlier, Pro- 
fessor Brock doesn't see any real dis- 
tinction between the two concepts. Is 
this also true of all the others who 
appeared on the program?) 
Can the Right to Assisted Suicide 
be Confined to the Terminally Ill? 
No doubt the ACLU, in challeng- 
ing the constitutionality of the Michi- 
gan prohibition against assisted sui- 
cide, will frame the issue narrowly; it 
will emphasize that it is only asserting 
the rights of the terminally ill who 
may desire death by suicide. But is 
there any principled way so to limit 
the right? 
Of course, it is good advocacy to 
frame the issue in terms of the rights 
of the "dying" or "terminally ill," but 
what reason (other than those of tac- 
tics) can be advanced for this posi- 
tion? If the merciful termination of 
suffering (or termination of an unen- 
durable existence) is the basis for this 
right, why limit it to those who are 
terminally ill? As Professor Robert 
Wennberg has asked: 
Why... should the non-terminal 
nature of one's suffering exclude 
one from qualifying or make it 
more difficult for one to qualify as 
a fitting subject for suicide? To be 
sure, the person with a non-termi- 
nal illness has longer to live, and 
should that person choose to 
commit suicide, he or she would 
be eliminating a greater span of 
future existence.... But [such a] 
person is also eliminating a pro- 
portionately greater quantum of 
pain and suffering, and if the 
smaller quantum justifies the 
elimination of the shorter span of 
life, then the greater quantum 
might justify the elimination of 
the longer span.26 
Alan Sullivan, who has presented 
one of the best arguments for a con- 
stitutional right to suicide, makes 
plain that he would not limit such a 
right to the terminally ill. "Surely," he 
observes, "under a variety of circum- 
stances life may be unendurable to a 
reasonable person, even though he 
does not face the prospect of immedi- 
ate and painful death."27 
It is interesting to note that, al- 
though he carefully circumscribes 
the right to assisted suicide in many 
respects, Dr. Quill would not limit it 
to the terminally ill. "The patient 
must have a condition," Quill tells us, 
"that is incurable, and associated 
with severe, unrelenting suffering." 
Though he anticipates that most 
people who desire physician-assisted 
suicide "will be imminently terminal," 
Quill does "not want to arbitrarily 
exclude persons with incurable, but 
not imminently terminal, progressive 
illnesses such as ALS or multiple 
sclerosis."'" But is it any less arbitrary 
to exclude the quadriplegic? The vic- 
tim ofa paralytic stroke? The mangled 
survivor of a road accident? A person 
afflicted with severe arthritis? 
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Why stop there? If a competent 
person comes to the unhappy conclu- 
sion that his existence is unbearable 
and freely, clearly, and repeatedly re- 
quests assisted suicide, why should 
he be rebuffed because he does not 
"qualify" under somebody else's stan- 
dards? Isn't this an arbitrary limita- 
tion of self-determination and per- 
sonal autonomy? "How," asks Daniel 
Callahan, "can self-determination 
have any limits? Why are not the per- 
son's desires or motives, whatever 
they be, sufficient?"29 
As I understand the position of 
those advocating a constitutional 
right to suicide and to assisted sui- 
cide, a person who "qualifies" should 
have the same right to enlist the aid 
of others to die by suicide as one 
now has to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining medical treatment.3s 
If so, it is fairly clear that once estab- 
lished, the right to assisted suicide 
will not be restricted to the termi- 
nally ill. For as demonstrated by 
such decisions as Elizabeth Bouvia, a 
case involving a young woman with 
severe cerebral palsy who was not ter- 
minally ill, and Larry McAfee, a case 
involving a quadriplegic who ap- 
parently had a long life expectancy, 
the right to terminate life support 
has not been so limited. Indeed, the 
view that life support cannot be 
stopped unless a patient is terminally 
ill-a notion that may have origi- 
nated in pre-Quinlan cases involving 
the refusal of blood transfusions by 
Jehovah's Witnesses-is one of the 
"myths" that Professor Alan Meisel 
has recently dispelled.31 
Upholding the Prohibition 
I share the view that before a state 
can punish its citizens for their ac- 
tions, "it must do more than assert 
that the choice they have made is an 
'abominable crime not fit to be 
named among Christians."' I agree, 
too, that "the fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as im- 
moral is not a sufficient reason for 
upholding a law prohibiting the prac- 
tice." But I believe that any state that 
prohibits assisted suicide can advance 
justifications for its legislation that go 
well beyond the law's conformity to 
religious doctrine or "morality." And 
I think these justifications are suffi- 
ciently strong to withstand constitu- 
tional attack. 
I am well aware that the reasons I 
shall set forth for upholding the new 
Michigan law and similar laws were 
not the originalreasons for condemn- 
ing suicide and assisted suicide. But 
ment or a failure to recognize or ade- 
quately to treat depressive illness in- 
fluenced by prejudice against and 
stereotypes about elderly people? 
How likely is it that the social 
sanctioning of "rational" suicide and 
assisted suicide will lead to an in- 
crease in "irrational" suicide and as- 
Any state that prohibits assisted suicide can advance 
justifications for its legislation that go well beyond the 
law's conformity to religious doctrine or "morality." 
the new "good reasons" people give 
for old rules and policies "do in- 
fluence the development of these 
policies" and "the 'good reasons' 
professed by our fathers yesterday are 
among the real reasons of the life of 
today." Assigning better reasons for 
the ban against assisted suicide than 
the old religious taboo against touch- 
ing the gates of life and death may be 
dismissed by some as a process of ra- 
tionalization, "but the seeking for 
good reasons ... plays a leading role 
in the life of civilization."33 
After all, that the criminal law arose 
to fill the need to regulate self-help 
and to obviate private vengeance 
does not render deterrence, in- 
capacitation, and rehabilitation any 
less of a "real reason" for drafting new 
criminal codes or revising old ones. 
Philosophers have spent much 
time and effort addressing such ques- 
tions as, When, if ever, is it "rational" 
for a person to want to commit sui- 
cide? Is there a moral right to commit 
"rational" suicide? But I think a legis- 
lator considering the desirability of a 
law prohibiting assisted suicide and a 
judge determining the constitution- 
ality of such a law could ask more 
relevant questions, such as: 
So far as we can tell, how common 
or rare is "rational" suicide? How 
often does suicide occur in the ab- 
sence of a psychiatric disorder? How 
often do primary care physicians fail 
to recognize treatable depression in 
their patients, especially elderly 
patients? How often is the failure of a 
primary care physician to take an ag- 
gressive approach to pain manage- 
sisted suicide? In a suicide-permissive 
society, how often will the "right" to 
commit suicide and the "right" to en- 
list the assistance of others in this en- 
terprise be interpreted, especially by 
the most vulnerable, as the "duty" to 
do so? In a suicide-permissive society, 
how often will a burdensome, elderly 
relative not otherwise desirous of 
death be "helped along" or pressured 
or "manipulated" into suicide? 
At one point in his argument for a 
constitutional right to suicide (and 
for the corollary right to enjoin 
government agents from taking steps 
to prevent suicide), Alan Sullivan dis- 
poses of a possible objection to his 
position-"that one suicide might en- 
courage other suicides and ought, for 
that reason, to be proscribed"--on 
the ground that "it rests upon psycho- 
logical assumptions about the suici- 
dal character that are beyond the 
scope of this essay." 
When writing about various sub- 
jects I too have put some issues "be- 
yond the scope of this essay." After all, 
there is only so much time and space 
to explore a difficult problem (or a 
cluster of problems). So Mr. Sullivan's 
decision is understandable, especially 
when one keeps in mind that suicide 
is a complicated subject that cuts 
across many disciplines. But a court 
assessing the constitutionality of a 
criminal prohibition against assisted 
suicide does not have the same lux- 
ury. It cannot put psychological as- 
sumptions and insights and "psycho- 
logical autopsy" studies of persons 
who die by suicide "beyond the 
scope" of their inquiries. 
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Such a court must do more, much 
more, than simply reason by analogy 
from the relevant precedents on the 
books. And such a court must keep in 
mind that it is doing something quite 
different from simply judging a de- 
bate among philosophers. As Profes- 
sor Philip Devine has observed: 
If philosophers have something 
to say to the law, so also has the 
law something to say to philos- 
ophers. Attention to the working, 
or the possible working, of any 
institution or principle may well 
give us insight into weaknesses 
which remain concealed so long 
as it is posed in sufficiently ab- 
stract terms.35 
The Dangers of Establishing a 
"Right" to Assisted Suicide 
Suicide is a problem of consid- 
erable magnitude. Although it once 
ranked twenty-second on the list of 
causes of death in the United States, 
it now ranks (depending on the par- 
ticular year) eighth or ninth. Every 
year there are between 25,000 and 
30,000 reported cases of suicide (and 
the number of cases is probably 
grossly underreported both because 
of the social stigma that attaches and 
because of the possible loss of life 
insurance benefits). Moreover, it is 
estimated that every year in this 
country several hundred thousand 
people attempt suicide and that 
about 10 percent of that group go on 
to kill themselves within a ten-year 
period. Although suicide occurs at 
an alarming rate among young 
people-adolescent suicide in this 
country increased 300 percent in the 
twenty years between 1955 and 1975, 
while suicides in the fifteen-to-twenty- 
four age group now constitute about 
one-fifth of all reported suicides-the 
highest suicide rates and the greatest 
number of suicides are found among 
people over the age of fifty. Indeed, 
for American white males, from 
childhood on, the risk of suicide rises 
linearly with age until the eighth de- 
cade of life. Suicides by people over 
the age of sixty account for about 25 
percent of all suicides.36 
No doubt the higher rate of suicide 
among the elderly has led advocates 
of the right to "rational" suicide and 
to assisted suicide to focus on this age 
group, especially on elderly people 
who are terminally ill. But the prob- 
lem of suicide is a good deal more 
complicated. Consider the views of 
Herbert Hendin, a professor of psy- 
chiatry and a leading suicidologist, 
who is opposed to the legalization of 
doctor-assisted suicide. He concedes 
that it is sometimes "rational" for a 
person with a painful terminal illness 
to wish to end his life. Indeed, "that is 
precisely why supporters of the 'right 
to suicide' or 'death control' position 
are constantly presenting the case of 
a patient suffering from incurable, 
painful cancer as the case on which 
they based their argument." But Dr. 
Hendin is quick to add: 
In reality... such understandable 
cases form only a small percent- 
age of all suicides, or potential 
suicides. The majority of suicides 
confront us with the problem of 
understanding people whose sit- 
uation does not seem, from an 
outsider's viewpoint, hopeless or 
often even critical. The knowl- 
edge that there are more suicides 
by people who wrongly believe 
themselves to be suffering from 
cancer than there are suicides by 
those who actually have cancer 
puts the7problem in some per- 
spective.s 
According to suicidologist David 
Clark, "the major studies all agree in 
showing that the fraction of suicide 
victims struggling with terminal ill- 
ness at the time of their death is in the 
range of 2% to 4%." Two-thirds of 
those who died by suicide when they 
were in their late sixties, seventies, 
and eighties "were in relatively good 
physical health."38 
To ask another relevant question, 
how often does suicide occur in the 
absence of a major psychiatric ill- 
ness? It would not be surprising if the 
answer to this question were affected 
by what one thought about the 
"right" to commit suicide. Some 
believe that virtually every person 
who wishes to die by suicide is "men- 
tally ill." Others maintain that such a 
person is simply called mentally ill so 
that his behavior may be controlled. 
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore 
the studies that do seem to bear on 
this question. And when one dips 
into the relevant literature one dis- 
covers considerable authority for the 
view that a suicide rarely occurs in the 
absence of a major psychiatric dis- 
order. 
Two of Timothy Quill's colleagues 
on the University of Rochester medi- 
cal faculty, Yeates Conwell and Eric 
Caine, geriatric psychiatrists who 
"work with suicidal people every 
day," warn that "notably lacking" 
from the debate about rational sui- 
cide and physician-assisted suicide is 
"attention to the effects of psychi- 
atric illness on rational decision 
making." They point to suicide study 
findings that "90 to 100 percent of 
the victims die while they have a diag- 
nosable psychiatric illness, an obser- 
vation that is equally true in suicides 
among the elderly."9 A number of 
other commentators use similarly 
high figures. 
The most commonly cited dis- 
orders associated with suicide are de- 
pressive affective disorders, also 
called "depressive illness" or "major 
depression," a verifiable and diag- 
nosable condition that is usually re- 
sponsive to prompt treatment. One 
aspect of major depression, that of 
hopelessness (which is transient and 
likely to respond to treatment), ap- 
pears to be the most probable and 
frequent source of the impairment 
that often leads to suicide. 
More significant for our purposes, I 
think, than the prevalence of depres- 
sive illness among people who die by 
suicide is the inability of depressed 
persons to recognize the severity of 
their own symptoms and the failure 
of primary physicians to detect major 
depression in their patients, espe- 
cially elderly patients. As Conwell and 
Caine emphasize: 
[M] any doctors on the front lines, 
who would be responsible for im- 
plementing any policy that al- 
lowed assisted suicide, are ill 
equipped to assess the presence 
and effect of depressive illness in 
older patients. In the absence of 
that sophisticated understanding, 
the determination of a suicidal 
patient's "rationality" can be no 
more than speculation, subject to 
the influence of personal biases 
about aging, old age, and the 
psychological effects of chronic 
disease.4? 
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"Ageism"-the prejudices and 
stereotypes applied to the elderly 
solely on the basis of their age-may 
manifest itself in a failure to recog- 
nize treatable depression, a refusal to 
take an aggressive approach to pain 
management, the view that an elderly 
person's desire to commit suicide is 
more "rational" than a younger 
patient's would be. As sociologist 
Menno Boldt has observed, "Suicidal 
persons are succumbing to what they 
experience as an overpowering and 
unrelenting coercion in their en- 
vironment to cease living. This sense 
of coercion takes many familiar 
forms: fear, isolation, abuse, useless- 
ness, and so on."41 
Will these pressures intensify in a 
society that sanctions assisted suicide 
(and thereby suicide as well)? In a 
suicide-permissive society, will family 
members so inclined be more likely 
to alter or manipulate a sick, elderly 
person's circumstances (for example, 
by providing shoddy or even hostile 
care) so that suicide becomes a rea- 
sonable, even an attractive choice? 
In a climate in which suicide is the 
"rational" thing to do, or at least a 
"reasonable" option, will it become 
the unreasonable 
thing not to do? The noble thing to do?4 In a suicide- 
permissive society plagued by short- 
ages of various kinds and a growing 
population of "nonproductive" people, 
how likely is it that an old or ill 
person will be encouraged to spare 
both herself and her family the 
agony of a slow decline, even though 
she would not have considered sui- 
cide on her own? 
The best discussion of both cir- 
cumstantial manipulation and ideo- 
logical manipulation appears in a 
famous essay by the philosopher 
Margaret Battin who, ironically, is a 
proponent of rational suicide. In an 
all-too-rare display of openminded, 
balanced scholarship, Professor Bat- 
tin presents a strong case against her 
own ultimate position. She conscien- 
tiously spells out how acceptance of 
her views would open the way for 
both individual and societal manipula- 
tion of vulnerable people into choos- 
ing death by suicide when they would 
not otherwise have done so. She con- 
cludes, nevertheless, that "on moral 
grounds we must accept, not reject, 
the notion of rational suicide.'43 
A state legislature is free to agree 
with Professor Battin, but must it? Is it 
constitutionally required to do so? I 
hardly think so. I believe a legislature 
is free to give Battin's insights about 
the dangers of "manipulated suicide" 
more weight than she herself seems 
believe, to assisted suicide. As Martin 
Marty and Ron Hamel have pointed 
out, "We are not merely a collection 
of isolated, self-determining individ- 
uals." It is unrealistic to think that we 
can sanction assisted suicide by in- 
dividuals without having an impact 
In a climate in which suicide is the "rational" thing to do, 
or at least a "reasonable" option, will it become the 
unreasonable thing not to do? 
willing to do; that is one of the risks, if 
one may call it that, one takes when 
one produces the kind of high-quality 
scholarship she does. 
Professor Battin may be saying 
something else: she may be conced- 
ing that the dangers of "manipulated 
suicide" are quite substantial, but they 
are trumped by one's "fundamental 
right" to die by suicide. At one point 
she maintains that we cannot deny 
"individuals in intolerable and ir- 
remediable circumstances their fun- 
damental right to die." Whether there 
is a "fundamental right" is the ques- 
tion, not the answer. I don't know 
how those of us who are not religious 
can get an authoritative ruling on 
whether morally there is a "fundamen- 
tal right" to choose death by suicide. 
But I think I do know that legally there 
is no such right. As we have seen, a 
decade after Professor Battin wrote 
her provocative essay, the Cruzan 
Court declined to accord the much 
less controversial liberty to terminate 
life-sustaining treatment "fundamen- 
tal right" status. 
Although she is painfully aware of 
"the moral quicksand" into which the 
notion of rational suicide "threatens 
to lead us," Professor Battin voices the 
hope that if we accept that concept 
"perhaps then we may discover a path 
around" the quicksand. Perhaps. Per- 
haps not. In any event, I submit, the 
Constitution does not prevent a 
legislature from reaching the conclu- 
sion that there is no safe path around. 
upon "the various communities of 
which they are a part, and even 
society as a whole."44 
I am willing to concede that the 
line between withholding or with- 
drawing life-sustaining medical treat- 
ment (what many have called passive 
euthanasia) and "ordinary" suicide 
and assisted suicide is not a neat, logi- 
cal line. But what line is? Surely not 
the line between assisted suicide and 
voluntary active euthanasia. Nor the 
line between the right of a terminally 
ill person to enlist the assistance of 
others in committing suicide and the 
right of a quadriplegic to seek similar 
assistance, or the right of a person 
who finds her inability even to shift 
position in her wheelchair intoler- 
able, or the right of a person with a 
progressive illness. 
I cannot believe that any court will 
recognize a constitutional right to sui- 
cide on request. But unless we carry 
the principle of self-determination or 
personal autonomy to its logical ex- 
treme-assisted suicide by any com- 
petent person who clearly and re- 
peatedly requests it for any reason she 
deems appropriate-we have to find 
a "stopping point" somewhere along 
the way. Any such stopping point will 
be somewhat illogical, somewhat ar- 
bitrary. So why not maintain the line 
we have now? 
Albert Alschuler, my counterpart at 
the University of Chicago Law 
School, recently declared: "[T]he 
strongest argument for the action- 
inaction line is that, despite its inde- 
terminacy and imprecision, we need 
it. We have no other line, and without 
it we sense no limits." Professor 
Alschuler may have overstated the 
Some Final Thoughts 
What has been said of voluntary 
active euthanasia applies as well, I 
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case, but not, I think, by very much. 
Why step across "the historic divide" 
only to draw another somewhat illogi- 
cal, somewhat arbitrary line some- 
where else? "[I]t is easier to move 
further down the slope than to climb 
back up.'"5 
In this article I have been focusing 
on the constitutional dimensions of 
the right to shape one's death. Thus, 
I do not have to argue that a state 
ought not cross the historic divide 
(although I would); I need only 
argue that it is not constitutionally 
compelled to do so. Consider the 
modern history of our attitudes and 
beliefs concerning death and dying: 
Recent court decisions have re- 
jected many of the distinctions 
commentators have proposed in 
earlier discussions about the right 
to die: not only the distinction 
between ordinary and extraordi- 
nary... treatment, but also the 
distinction between actively 
hastening death by terminating 
treatment and passively allowing 
a person to die of a disease, be- 
tween withholding and withdraw- 
ing life-sustaining treatment, and 
between the termination of artifi- 
cial feedings and the termination 
of other forms of life-sustaining 
treatment.46 
If, as has well been said, "the his- 
tory of our activities and beliefs con- 
cerning the ethics of death and dying 
is a history of lost distinctions of 
former significance,"47 what reason is 
there to think that that history will 
come to an end when we sanction 
assisted suicide for the terminally ill? 
What reason is there to doubt that in 
the not-too-distant future the distinc- 
tion between assisted suicide and vol- 
untary euthanasia or the distinction 
between the terminally ill and other 
seriously ill people would become 
still other "lost distinctions of former 
significance"? 
I can hear the cries of protest: 
"slippery slope" arguments are a com- 
mon debating tactic. Yes they are- 
about as common as the technique of 
overcoming opposition to a desired 
goal by proceeding step by step. 
I am grateful to my colleagues Larry 
Kramer and Richard Pildes, and Univer- 
sity of Michigan law student Marc Spin- 
delman for helpful comments. 
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